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FERC V. EPSA AND ADJACENT STATE REGULATION
OF CUSTOMER ENERGY RESOURCES
Jim Rossi * and Jon Wellinghoff **
INTRODUCTION
he Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”)1 was a major victory for
demand response—efforts to coordinate customers not using energy—
in wholesale electric power markets. Justice Kagan’s decision for a six-Justice
majority2 recognized that a watt is a watt, regardless of whether its source is a
power producer or a customer (or group of customers) forgoing energy consumption. EPSA’s majority viewed demand response as vital to promoting
reliability and efficiency in energy markets. In upholding the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) rules to encourage participation of demand response resources in wholesale demand power markets, the Court ended
an ongoing battle surrounding compensation of demand response providers.
Regulatory certainty about demand response resources will help to relieve
congestion, reduce the need for new power plants, and promote renewable
sources of energy.3
This Essay explores EPSA’s implications on FERC’s jurisdiction over customer-level clean energy resources such as state net metering policies for
rooftop solar and energy storage programs. Since the Federal Power Act’s
(“FPA”) adoption by Congress in 1935, most judicial decisions have ap-
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136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
2
This 6-2 line up is somewhat unusual: Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.
As discussed below, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice
Alito did not participate in review of the case or the decision.
3
See, e.g., Darius Dixon, Supreme Court Backs Federal Authority in Power Saving Rule,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/BDA2-6A6Y?type=image (quoting Environmental
Defense Fund President Fred Krup, “Today’s Supreme Court decision is a victory for all Americans
who want greater choice and value broader customer access to clean, low-cost energy”); id. (quoting
Allison Clements of Natural Resources Defense Council, who said the decision is key “because
demand response is flexible and fast-acting, [so] it enables the affordable integration of more wind
and solar power into the electricity transmission grid”).
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proached federal-state jurisdictional disputes with reference to a jurisdictional
“bright line.”4 Rather than fixate on this divide, the EPSA majority approached
FERC’s jurisdiction in a functional manner, endorsing pragmatism over
formalism in the regulation of energy markets. Unlike many past cases that
fixated on a jurisdictional bright line, EPSA did not define a turf for state
policymaking as beyond FERC’s reach but instead recognized how state
policies operate adjacent to FERC’s regulation of practices affecting wholesale
rates. As the first Supreme Court case to explicitly recognize cooperative
federalism programs in the regulation of modern energy markets under the
FPA, ESPA is also a victory for state policy flexibility. At the same time, its
endorsement of expansive FERC authority to address discriminatory practices
will only help to ensure that state clean energy policies complement—and do
not work at odds with—competitive, efficient and reliable energy markets.
I.

EPSA’s Pragmatism in Defining FERC’s Jurisdiction

EPSA resoundingly rejected a D.C. Circuit panel conclusion that FERC’s
demand response regulation (Order 745) is ultra vires under the FPA because it
regulates retail sales.5 In reversing the D.C. Circuit, EPSA held that FERC’s
authority to adopt Order 745 is firmly supported by the clear language of
sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. According to the majority, the language of
the FPA should not be read “against its clear terms, to halt a practice [such as
demand response] that so-evidently allows the Commission to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the wholesale
energy market.”6
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the EPSA majority reasoned that the FPA
clearly authorizes FERC to regulate compensation for customer demand
4

As the Court stated more than 50 years ago:
Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between federal and
state jurisdiction, making unnecessary [] case-by-case analysis [of conflicts].
This was done in the Power Act by making FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which
Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by the states.
Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
5
See EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit also held that FERC’s
rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because FERC
failed to provide a “direct response” to some of the objections made by commentators who maintained FERC’s rules would overcompensate demand response, resulting in discriminatory rates. Id.
at 224–25.
6
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 764. The Court upheld FERC’s demand regulations against an arbitrary and
capricious standard, reversing the D.C. Circuit on this ground as well. Id. at 773.
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response participation in interstate energy markets. Order 745 did not attempt
to regulate demand response as a wholesale sale of energy. Rather, FERC based
its adoption of Order 745 on the FPA’s delegation to the agency of authority to
address “practices . . . affecting” its jurisdictional sales, 7 because the agency
concluded that failure to regulate demand response participation would encumber competitive, efficient, and reliable wholesale power markets.
Agreeing with FERC, the EPSA majority rejected the D.C. Circuit’s argument that Order 745 represented an agency power grab that lacks any
limiting principle. The Court reasoned that FERC’s jurisdictional basis for
Order 745 would not allow the agency to regulate any market activity, but (in
accordance with established judicial precedents) only those practices that
directly affected wholesale markets. Demand response “pays consumers for
commitments to curtail their use of power, so as to curb wholesale rates and
prevent grid breakdowns,”8 which according to the Court is within the agency’s
clear statutory authorization “with room to spare.” 9 Excluding wholesale
demand response from FERC’s jurisdiction, the Court added, would “prevent[]
all use of a tool that no one . . . disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability
in the wholesale electricity market.”10
The EPSA majority also rejected the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the
FPA reserves to state regulators exclusive authority over retail customer participation in wholesale demand response markets. Section 201(b) of the FPA
expressly states that the provisions of the statute do not apply to “any other sale
of electric energy” (other than wholesale sales). The D.C. Circuit had relied on
this language to conclude that “[b]ecause FERC’s rule entails direct regulation
of the retail market—a matter exclusively within state control—it exceeds the
Commission’s authority.”11 EPSA’s majority noted that setting retail rates is
beyond FERC’s jurisdiction under the plain terms of this provision of the FPA,
but in Order 745 “the Commission has not regulated retail sales.”12 FERC’s
regulation of demand response does not violate the FPA’s proscription on
regulating “any other sale” “just because it affects—even substantially—the

7

16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a).
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770.
9
Id. at 774.
10
Id. at 773.
11
EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In a dissent, Judge Harry Edwards treated
the jurisdictional issue as ambiguous under the FPA, and indicated that he would have deferred to
FERC’s interpretation of the statute. Id. at 227.
12
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773.
8
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quantity or terms of retail sales.”13 Rather, the Court reasoned, “When FERC
regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its
charge to improve how the market runs, then no matter the effect on retail
rates [the FPA] imposes no bar.”14
In upholding FERC’s jurisdiction to adopt Order 745, EPSA made a
strong appeal to statutory purpose.15 Congress adopted the FPA in 1935 to
close the “Attleboro gap,” a regulatory void due to limits the Supreme Court
had imposed on state regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.16 As
the Supreme Court has consistently noted, in adopting the FPA “Congress
interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale.”17 Additionally, if FERC were to lack jurisdiction
over demand response, the majority warned, no regulator—federal or state—
would be able to address activities regarding demand response in wholesale
power markets, since “state commissions could not regulate [wholesale] demand response bids either.” 18 Drawing a parallel to Attleboro, the majority
added, “Congress passed the FPA precisely to eliminate vacuums of authority
over the electricity markets.”19
Justice Scalia’s dissent in EPSA, joined by Justice Thomas, called the majority’s jurisdictional analysis “extravagant.”20 It is perhaps fitting that Justice
Scalia’s last published dissent before his untimely death took aim at the EPSA
majority’s focus on statutory purpose, given his distaste for the use of legislative
history in the interpretation of statutes. He raised particular concern with the
majority’s reference to a 1961 decision that interpreted the Natural Gas Act so
as to avoid the creation of a regulatory “no man’s land.”21 In that opinion, the
Court noted that “in a borderline case where congressional authority is not
explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given
13

Id. at 776.
Id. at 764.
15
As the Court noted, its determination is based on the clear language of the statute, not any sort
of deference to the agency. Id. at 773 n.5 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
16
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
17
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953). See also New York v.
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal
regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in
Attleboro . . . .”).
18
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961).
14
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area and, if we find it cannot, we are impelled to decide that federal authority
governs.”22 By preventing the creation of “any” regulatory “no man’s land,” the
EPSA majority explained, “The [Federal Power] Act makes federal and state
powers ‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that “there [will] be no ‘gaps’
for private interests to subvert the public welfare.”23
A practical consequence of EPSA’s focus on this statutory purpose of closing regulatory gaps is that the FPA’s allocation of federal-state authority over
practices affecting rates cannot always result in a strict separation of authority,
as a jurisdictional bright line would dictate. Rather, to the extent the FPA does
not expressly foreclose it, the statute authorizes both federal and state regulators to regulate the same activities in energy markets. FERC’s regulation of
demand response occurs against the backdrop of a variety of different state
policy approaches regarding customer demand response in retail markets,
which encourages state experimentation. State policy flexibility regarding
customer demand response has allowed new technologies and markets to
develop to fit regional circumstances. FERC’s expansive authority over practices affecting rates allows FERC to step in, if necessary, while also promoting
complementary forms of state regulation—thus ensuring that no aspect of
demand response participation in interstate energy markets goes unregulated.
II. Pragmatic Experimentation in Regulation of Customer Energy
Resources

EPSA recognized how FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale energy market
practices—such as demand response—is not fixed. As customer energy resource
technologies and markets evolve, it is inevitable that FERC’s jurisdiction will
expand into some arenas state regulators once considered exclusively their own
turf. At the same time, EPSA showed the potential for FERC’s regulation of
energy markets to pragmatically accommodate adjacent and complementary
state policy experimentation.
Despite the majority’s recognition of FERC’s authority to address demand
response, EPSA also leaves state regulators considerable flexibility to pursue
their own adjacent policy experiments with retail customer demand response.
In upholding Order 745, the Supreme Court was careful not to invite topdown regulation of clean energy initiatives. Indeed, EPSA was particularly

22
23

Id.
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
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attentive to the significance of private and state policy initiatives in encouraging
the development of customer demand response resources.
State-led policy experimentation with customer energy resources is consistent with the basic jurisdictional principles FERC endorsed in its regulation
of demand response. To begin, EPSA rejected the D.C. Circuit’s specious
argument that Order 745 overreaches because it “lure[s]” retail customers into
the wholesale market.24 The Court reasoned that FERC’s regulation of demand
response compensation is driven by the customer’s decision to participate in
wholesale energy markets: If a retail customer forgoing energy consumption
does not choose to bid into wholesale demand response markets, it simply is
not subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.
Also of significance, EPSA upheld FERC’s demand rules as a “program of
cooperative federalism.” Order 745 (which extends FERC’s earlier policy in
Order 719) “allows any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making
demand response bids in the wholesale market,” thus giving states “the means
to block whatever ‘effective’ increases in retail rates demand response programs
might be thought to produce.”25 This “opt out” option allows FERC to set
basic expectations for demand response resources in wholesale markets without
discouraging state regulators from experimenting with a wide range of complementary approaches to promote energy conservation.
Allowing state experimentation in retail customer demand response policies to continue adjacent with FERC’s regulation of practices affecting
wholesale rates can produce significant benefits. State flexibility in approaching
demand response has promoted diverse policy experiments with customer
demand response, especially given differences in state approaches to utility
regulation. As a bottom-up approach, such policy flexibility has allowed demand response resources to develop while also enabling markets and regulators
to learn about the viability of various retail customer demand response initiatives.
In a similar manner, EPSA sets the stage for state customer energy policies, such as net metering and customer storage programs, to flourish. To the
extent that customer energy resource programs address distribution or generation facilities, the plain language of Section 201(b) of the FPA would appear to
foreclose FERC from regulating them at all. Beyond this express prohibition
on the regulation of certain facilities, EPSA clarifies that FERC may still
regulate wholesale rates and practices that directly affect them. However,

24
25

Id. at 778.
Id. at 780.
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FERC has consistently disavowed exercising any jurisdiction over customer
compensation for net metering on the grounds that metering does not constitute a wholesale sale unless it results in a net sale over the customer’s billing
period.26 EPSA makes it undeniably clear that state regulators should retain
flexibility in approaching net metering policies. Other state policy initiatives for
customer energy resources, such as incentives for retail customer energy storage,
similarly would benefit from allowing states flexibility to experiment with their
own policy approaches.
After EPSA, however, it is also clear that the language of the FPA does
not provide a fixed safe harbor that automatically exempts all state policy
experimentation from FERC’s reach, as a bright line approach to jurisdiction
would suggest. Rather, the FPA’s allocation of federal-state authority in this
context is pragmatic and allows for adjacent state policies that complement
FERC’s regulatory initiatives under the FPA. There still must be some outer
limit on what states can do in regulating customer energy resources, especially
when states aim their initiatives at protecting incumbents at the cost of competitive, efficient, and reliable interstate markets.
At the extreme, no state can outright prohibit a power supplier from selling into the wholesale market, as this would encroach into FERC’s jurisdiction
over wholesale energy sales. As the Court made clear last term in ONEOK v.
Learjet,27 state policies cannot target FERC jurisdictional programs, especially
in ways that conflict with them.28 The Supreme Court’s pending review of the
Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Maryland’s capacity incentives for new natural gas
plants (on federal preemption grounds) will help to clarify the extent to which
states retain authority over generation incentives that overlap with FERCapproved market rules.29
Similarly, if demand response is to operate as a cooperative federalism program, FERC must ultimately possess some authority to address the most
egregious barriers to customer participation in interstate energy markets.
EPSA’s majority reasoned that FERC’s demand response rule’s “opt out”
26

Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2009), order on reh’g 131 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2010);
MidAmerican, 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,262–64 (2001). For discussion, see Jim Rossi, Federalism
and the Net Metering Alternative, ELECTRICITY J., Feb. 2016, at 13.
27
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (upholding state antitrust regulation of
natural gas sales).
28
Id. at 1599 (courts must consider “the target at which the state law aims in determining whether
[the] law is pre-empted.”).
29
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, Hughes v.
Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382, No. 14-614 (Oct. 19, 2015); CPV Maryland, LLC v. Talen
Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 356, No. 14-623 (Oct. 19, 2015).
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opportunity for states (who may choose to eliminate customer bidding into
wholesale demand response markets) “removes any conceivable doubt” as to its
compliance with the allocation of federal-state authority under the FPA. 30
However, the majority’s analysis falls short of reasoning that the FPA requires
FERC to allow a state to opt out any time it regulates activities that impact
retail sales. Much like New York v. FERC31 recognized FERC’s authority to
regulate bundled retail transmission, even though the agency had not exercised
this authority in its open access regulations,32 ESPA envisions how the agency’s
market policies can evolve and reach into some areas states previously may have
regulated on their own. FERC’s opt-out policy certainly bolstered the rationality of the agency’s demand response regulations, in the view of the EPSA
majority. But the Court did not conclude that state veto option is required by
the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation of state barriers to
demand response as a practice affecting wholesale markets. As long as FERC
exercises its authority over a practice that directly affects wholesale markets,
nothing in the FPA requires the agency to always give the states a way of
opting out of wholesale market policies.
For example, Order 745 allows states to prohibit any retail customer demand response participation in wholesale markets. In recognition of a diversity
of state approaches, nothing in Order 745 also appears to require a state to
endorse any specific retail demand response program, let alone eliminate state
prohibitions on retail customer participation in wholesale markets. If, however,
FERC were to make a finding that a state’s prohibition on retail customer
bidding demand response resources into wholesale markets serves no purpose
but to protect incumbents while significantly harming competition in interstate
energy markets, agency elimination of this barrier could be warranted. Under
current FERC policies, some states similarly limit retail customers from
providing excess energy from rooftop solar or energy storage to the grid, and
some of these state barriers could similarly go too far.
EPSA’s recognition of flexibility for state retail demand response policies
as long as these complementary federal energy market objectives can help us to
understand how best to approach state policy experimentation with other
customer energy resources. For example, states cannot prohibit utilities from
offering net metering to retail customers. Under a statute Congress adopted in
2005, utilities are required to offer net metering “upon request,” and states are
30

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
New York v. FERC, 533 U.S. 1 (2002).
32
Id. at 28 (noting that FERC’s choice not to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission in
its open access order “represents a statutorily permissible policy choice”).
31
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required to consider net metering programs; to the extent a state regulatory
authority declines to implement a net metering program, it is required to state
the reasons for this in writing.33 Even beyond this federal statutory standard, if
FERC were to find that a state’s regulatory prohibition on new entrants serves
no purpose but benefitting incumbents while threatening competitive wholesale
markets (as some state limits on third-party solar providers may), the agency
could potentially address these barriers. For similar reasons, FERC appears to
possess the authority to eliminate significant state barriers to retail customer
energy storage resource participation in wholesale markets.
Order 745 was the culmination of an evolving major federal policy initiative to encourage wholesale demand response participation, while FERC’s
policies regarding many other customer energy resources, such as retail net
metering and energy storage, remain inchoate. As with demand response, the
agency may find it expedient to encourage states to pursue a broad range of
policy options with net metering and customer storage, including allowing
states to opt out by prohibiting customers from participating. It seems particularly important for FERC to consider using a cooperative federalism approach
to encourage adjacent complementary state policy initiatives where new technologies are just getting off the ground.
CONCLUSION

EPSA is far more than a victory for demand response participation in
wholesale markets. It also invites policy experimentation, without fixing a
sphere of authority for state regulators that lays beyond the FPA’s reach. As
with FERC’s approach to demand response, the agency’s regulatory initiatives
for other customer energy resources should continue to consider cooperative
federalism programs that provide flexibility, including the possibility of a state
opt out. Just as important, a state veto is not required by the FPA and should
not be understood as an invitation for parochialism or for protecting incumbents at the expense of competitive, efficient, and reliable interstate power
markets. EPSA leaves states considerable leeway in adopting policy initiatives
for customer energy resources, but FERC cannot shy away from exercising its
statutory responsibility to set basic ground rules for interstate energy markets—
including the elimination of significant state barriers, where warranted.

33

See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 966 (2005) (amending
section 111(d) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978).

